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CROWN v. COMMISSIONER: GIFT TAXATION AND
INTEREST-FREE LOANS AMONG FAMILY MEMBERS
Congress enacted the gift tax ' both to supplement the income and
estate taxes and to preclude the avoidance of those taxes through a
practice of inter vivos giving 2 The code provisions of the current gift
tax, which-was established in 1932, 3 broadly describe the kinds of
property and types of transfers subject to gift taxation. Consistent
with the sweeping scope intended by Congress, 5 the judiciary has construed these provisions liberally in ascertaining the transactions subject to the gift tax.6
In the recent case of Crown v. Commissioner,7 however, the Tax
Court held that interest-free loans to family members are not taxable
gifts. Consequently, one may transfer significant amounts of money
to family members without incurring gift tax obligations, despite
contrary congressional and judicial determinations in analogous
transactions. Crown thus sanctions an exception to the congressional
system of comprehensive taxation in which the interrelated estate,
gift, and income taxes 8 are designed to tax the realization of income
and the transfer of money or property.9 Furthermore, the decision
1. The principal provisions of the gift tax are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524.
2.
The gift tax will supplement both the estate tax and the income tax.
It will tend to reduce the incentive to make gifts in order that distribution of future income from the donated property may be to a number of
persons with the result that the taxes imposed by the higher brackets
of the income tax law are avoided. It will also tend to discourage
transfers for the purpose of avoiding the estate tax.
H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 40 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. pt. 2, 457, 477. See Smith v.
Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 n.1 (1943). See generally Harriss, Legislative
History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531, 533 (1940).
3. Gift Tax Act of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 501-532, 47 Stat. 245-59.
4. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2511(a), which provides in part: "[TJhe tax imposed by
section 2501 shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether
the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal,
tangible or intangible .....

5.
6.
7.
8.

See text accompanying note 10 infra.
See notes 20-28, 79-83 infra & accompanying text.
67 T.C. 1060 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir., Sept. 2, 1977).
See, e.g., Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 (1943) ; C. LoWNDES & R.

KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES 576-77 (2d ed. 1962).
9. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 8, at 576.
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subverts the congressional intent to subject to gift taxation "all the
protean arrangements which the wit of men can devise that are not
business transactions within the meaning of ordinary speech." 10
After briefly tracing the legislative and judicial history of the gift
tax, this Comment will review the decisions involving both income and
gift tax issues that shaped the analytical framework for the Tax
Court's opinion in Crown. Thereafter, an examination of Crown itself
will reveal the impropriety of the court's holding and provide the
requisite understanding to forecast the effects of the decision.
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE GIFT TAX

Although the Internal Revenue Code does not define the term
"gift," n1the Senate Committee Report 12 provides evidence of the
breadth that Congress intended both for that particular word and for
the provisions of the entire tax: "The words 'transfer . . .by gift'
and 'whether ... direct or indirect' . . . comprehend all transactions
[in which] property or a property right is donatively passed to or
conferred upon another, regardless of the means or device employed
in its accomplishment."1 - In this context the term "gift" does not incorporate its common law meaning 14 because a taxable transfer need
not embody a specific donative intent.'- Rather, Congress adopted an
10. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945).
11. D. KAHN & E. COLSON, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS, AND TRUSTS
251 (2d ed. 1975); C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 8, at 574.
12. S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. pt.
2, 496, 524.
13. Id. Property has been construed judicially to include contingent and noncontingent rights and interests in property. See, e.g., Robinette v. Helvering, 318
U.S. 184 (1943) (contingent remainder interest); Herzog v. Commissioner, 116
F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941) (contingent life estate); Lois J. Newman, 19 T.C. 708
(1953), aff'd on other grounds, 222 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1955) (rights to an income
tax refund); Harold B. Adams, 22 T.C.M. (P-H) 1996 (1953) (rights in patent
applications). "Even though concepts of property and value may be slippery
and elusive, they cannot escape taxation so long as they are used in the world of
business." 5 J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION 39 (1959).
See also C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 8, at 588-89.
14. The common law defines a gift as "a voluntary transfer of property by the
owner to another without consideration or compensation .... A donative intent
is necessary to constitute a valid gift." C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF PROPERTY 469 (2d ed. 1971).
15. Donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential
element in the application of the gift tax to the transfer. The application of the tax is based on the objective facts of the transfer and the
circumstances under which it is made, rather than on the subjective
motives of the donor.
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objective measurement, the "adequacy of the consideration" test, to
identify a gift for tax purposes.' Under this test, the amount of any
transfer subject to gift taxation consists of the difference between
the fair market value of the property or property right conveyed and
7
the sum of the consideration received in exchange.'
Circumventing the requirement of establishing a subjective donative intent, the adequacy of the consideration test promotes administrative convenience and authorizes the taxation of a wide variety of
conveyances. If a transfer arises from arm's length negotiations between parties in the ordinary course of business, however, this test
is inappropriate and the transaction will not be considered a gift,
regardless of the disparity of consideration.' Hence, the gift tax
law does not penalize businessmen for making poor bargains.' 9
Judicial decisions generally have recognized the broad purposes of
the gift tax laws and have upheld the taxation of many direct gifts,
including transfers of promissory notes 20 and United States savings
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g) (1) (1958). See Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303,
306 (1945) ; Gilbert Pleet, 17 T.C. 77, 82 (1951).
16. I.R.C. § 2512(b), which provides in pertinent part: "Where property is
transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of
the consideration shall be deemed a gift .... " Further distinguishing a common
law gift, the Regulations provide:
Transfers reached by the gift tax are not confined to those only
which, being without a valuable consideration, accord with the common law concept of gifts, but embrace as well sales, exchanges, and
other dispositions of property for a consideration to the extent that
the value of the property transferred by the donor exceeds the value
in money or money's worth of the consideration given therefor.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958). The consideration must be quantifiable in specific
monetary terms; intangible values such as love or moral obligations will be
disregarded when determining the amount of a gift. See, e.g., Commissioner v.
Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 305 (1945); Holzman, The Nature of Taxable Gifts, 43
TAXES 189, 194 (1965).
17. See note 16 supra.
18. "[A] sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made in the ordinary
course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free
from any donative intent), will be considered as made for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth." Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).
19. See Estate of Monroe D. Anderson, 8 T.C. 706, 720-21 (1947); D. KAHN
& E. COLSON, supra note 11, at 256; see generally 5 J. MERTENS, supra note 13,
at 99.
20. Brown v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1957); Woodward v. United
States, 208 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1953).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:361

bonds,2 1 assignments of future income, 22 and forgiveness of debts.2 3

Similarly, indirect gifts, which include no obvious presentation of
property but nevertheless confer a gratuitous benefit on the donee,
also may generate tax liability.24 Examples of the latter type of gift
are: payment of another's bills, obligations, or expenses ;25 transfers
for the benefit of a third party; 2-0 creation of partnership interests ;27
and disclaimers of inheritance or bequests. 28 Moreover, an interest-free
loan, providing its borrower with the use of its proceeds without cost,
could be characterized as an indirect gift.
THE INCOME TAX ANALOGY

Before Crown, the judiciary addressed the issue of the taxability as
gifts of interest-free loans only once.2 1 Nevertheless, the responses
of other courts to related questions provide insight for an analysis
of the Tax Court's decision in Crown. For example, the basic problem
of ascertaining whether an interest-free loan transfers a taxable
value 30 has arisen in the context of similar situations involving
income tax issues. Section 482 of the Code authorizes the Commissioner to allocate income among related corporations to reflect ac21. Rev. Rul. 68-269, 1968-1 C.B. 399. Although a savings bond's interest is
exempt from income taxation, a gift tax may be imposed on any gratuitous
transfer of the property itself. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 8, at
586; 5 J. MERTENS, supra note 13, at 19.
22. Galt v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
951 (1955); Lockard v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1948). But see
Emily C. Collins, 1 T.C. 605 (1943) (no taxable gift to corporation on waiver of
preferred stock dividend arrearages).
23. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a) (1958). See Estate of Grace E. Lang v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 404 (1975).
24. See I.R.C. § 2511(a). "[lIt has been said that it is not necessary to the
operation of the gift tax that the donor affirmatively go through the ritual of
making a gift. The term 'indirectly' is used in the broadest and most comprehensive sense." 5 J. MERTENS, supra note 13, at 78, citing Chase Nat'l Bank, 25 T.C.
617 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 913 (1959).
25. Drybough v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Rev. Rul.
54-343, 1954-2 C.B. 318.
26. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (2)-(3) (1958).
27. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); William H. Gross, 7 T.C.
837 (1946).
28. Ianthe B. Hardenbergh, 17 T.C. 166 (1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958). A "qualified disclaimer" is not regarded as a taxable transfer. I.R.C. § 2518.
29. Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D.Tex. 1966). For a discussion of Johnson see notes 49-52 infra & accompanying text.
30. See 5 J. MERTENS, supra note 13, at 34-35.
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curately the earnings of each entity.3 1 Maintaining that the section
permits only the allocation of income, rather than its creation, 32 courts
initially rebuffed the Commissioner's attempts to treat loans of
interest-free money or of rent-free equipment as sources of income
to the lending corporations.3 3 In B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner,3 4
however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit approved the
allocation of this type of income if the Commissioner could demonstrate that interest would have been charged had the transaction been
conducted at arm's length.3 5 Imputing interest income to the lender
as if the loan actually had been made in a bona fide commercial context,3 6 the Second Circuit's valuation technique closely approximated
the adequacy of the consideration test. Of greater significance, the
court's ratification of the Commissioner's decision to subject this
imputed interest to income taxation implicitly recognizes that the use
value of a loan is a valuable property right. Accordingly, the gratui31. I.R.C. § 482 provides in pertinent part:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses ...
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations...
if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation
is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
the income of any of such organization ....
32. "[Tlhe respondent [Commissioner] has not distributed, apportioned, or
allocated gross income, but has created income where none in fact existed."
Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16 T.C. 287, 293-94 (1951), acq. 1951-1 C.B. 3.
33. See, e.g., Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508
(6th Cir. 1940); Huber Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 598 (1971); PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 928 (1970); Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16
T.C. 287 (1951), acq. 1951-1 C.B. 3. The Commissioner later explained his
acquiescence in Smith-Bridgman & Co. as embracing only the principle that §
482 required complementary adjustments to the income of each related corporation. See Rev. Rul. 67-79, 1971-1 C.B. 117.
34. 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972).
35. Id. at 1155. The court stated:
To the extent that the above cases cited by taxpayers [see note 33
supra] may be read as holding that no interest can be allocated under
§ 482 ...they are not in accord with either economic reality, or with
the declared purpose of section 482 ....

[I]nterest income may be

added to taxpayers' incomes, as long as a correlative adjustment is
made to Midtown ....

Id. at 1156. The holding in B. Forman Co. has been followed in Fitzgerald Motor
Co. v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1975); Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d
1 (8th Cir. 1973).
36. See generally O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND. L.
REv. 1085, 1096-1103 (1974).
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tous transfer of this right through a deliberate failure to charge
interest should be regarded as a taxable gift.
Corporate-shareholder transactions have presented questions similar to those in B. Forman Co. The Commissioner repeatedly has described a shareholder's interest-free or rent-free use of corporate funds
or property as a valuable interest that may be taxable either as a
constructive dividend or as compensation for services rendered.3 7
With respect to the rent-free use of corporate property, the courts
generally have sustained the Commissioner's position.38 In J. Simpson
Dean,30 however, the Tax Court held in favor of the borrowers, stating
that "an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower." 4 Distinguishing the conflicting precedent established by
cases involving the rent-free use of corporate property, the court
noted that, in each, the corporation bestowed on the taxpayer a benefit
otherwise obtainable only by a nondeductible expenditure. 41 In contrast, if the petitioners in Dean had borrowed the money on interest42
bearing notes, the interest paid would have been deductible.
In effect, the court's declaration that a shareholder derives no
taxable gain from an interest-free loan merely provides the taxpayer
with the benefit of the corresponding interest deduction that would
have been available if he had acquired his loan in a commercial money
market. 43 Presumably, when no offsetting deductions are available,
as in the rent-free property use situations, a court should regard use
value as a taxable item. Under this rationale, the decision in Dean does
37. See, e.g., Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d
Cir. 1974); Chandler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941); Saunders v.
United States, 294 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Hawaii 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 450
F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971); Rapid Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 232 (1973);
Elliot J. Roschuni, 29 T.C. 1193 (1958) ; Paulina DuPont Dean, 9 T.C. 256 (1947).
38. See, e.g., Chandler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941); Elliot
J. Roschuni, 29 T.C. 1193 (1958) ; Paulina DuPont Dean, 9 T.C. 256 (1947).
39. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
40. Id. at 1090.
41. Id.
42. Id. Criticizing the Tax Court's decision in Dean, one commentator has
argued that the shareholder should not be permitted an interest deduction on a
loan from his corporation unless the corporation is required to report a corresponding amount of interest income received. O'Hare, supra note 36, at 1096.
43. Four concurring judges in Dean determined that because this deduction
was available the majority had decided unnecessarily that interest-free loans
provided no income for borrowing shareholders. 35 T.C. at 1090-91 (concurring
opinion). In Crown, the dissenting judge adopted this rationale to distinguish
Dean: "In [Dean], we did not hold that the interest-free loan failed to produce
income; it was merely held that such loans did not result in taxable income
since it was assumed that there would be deductions to offset income." Crown v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060, 1070 (dissenting opinion).
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not undermine the Commissioner's position in Crown that the gratuitous transfer of the use value of money may constitute a taxable gift.
Another group of income tax cases deserves consideration in an
analysis of the decision in Crown. The judiciary has determined that
a gratuitous transfer of the use value of money or property may
qualify as a charitable contribution for income tax purposes. As a
result, taxpayers validly have deducted from their incomes amounts
equal to the rental value of property loaned free to charitable institutions, 44 regardless of whether the property otherwise would have
been rented profitably.4 5 Similarly, taxpayers have been permitted
to deduct the use value of low interest loans extended in charitable
gift transactions. For example, in Mason v. United States 46 a charity
purchased a business for a small down payment and a low interest
bearing note having a face amount equal to the balance owed for the
property. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined
that the difference between the fair market value of the business less
the down payment and the discounted value of the note was a deductible charitable contribution. 47 The court noted:
[T] he gift might be characterized as the value to the charity
of the taxpayer's willingness to forego the receipt of the fair
market rate of interest on this note over this extended period
of time. The fact that the taxpayer will ultimately be paid
the principal sum does not mean that the charity has not
been benefitted or that the 48taxpayer has in fact recovered
that which he has foregone.
Generally, a gratuitous transfer qualifying for an income tax deduction as a charitable contribution also will be exempt from gift taxation.49 Nevertheless, the Code clearly refers to the transaction as a
gift.50 When an identical transfer fails to qualify for charitable treatment merely because the donee is not an approved recipient, however,
the transaction does not cease to be a gift; rather, it never attains a
privileged status under the tax laws. Because a low interest or interestfree loan may be characterized as a gift for the purpose of receiving
44. See, e.g., Threlfall v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Wis. 1969);
Thriftimart, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 598 (1973); John G. Allen v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 12 (1971); Priscilla M. Sullivan, 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
45. See Threlfall v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1114, 1120 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
46. 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975).
47. See id. at 30.
48. Id. at 30 n.15.
49. Compare I.R.C. § 170(c) (charitable contributions generating deductions
from gross income), with id. § 2522(a) (charitable transfers exempt from gift
taxation).
50. Id. §§ 170 (c), 2522 (a).
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favorable income tax consideration, it should be regarded as a gift
even though favorable tax consequences are unavailable. Therefore,
an intrafamilial interest-free loan should constitute a taxable gift
equivalent to the use value of the proceeds.
SPECIFIC GIFT TAX PRECEDENT

Prior to Crown, only one court had examined whether interest-free
loans to family members are subject to the gift tax. In Johnson v.
United States,51 the District Court for Northern Texas held in favor
of petitioner who, with her husband, had made substantial interestfree demand loans over a period of years to her adult children. 52 Although the children repaid most of the loans' proceeds before the husband's death in 1962, the Commissioner nevertheless assessed a gift
tax deficiency for the years 1956 to 1962 based on the use value of the
outstanding principal. 53 The district court rejected the Commissioner's
assessment, concluding that the purpose of the gift tax, to avoid depletion of estates through inter vivos giving, was not defeated because
the loan's principal remained in the gross estate.5 4 According to the
court, the law required a parent neither to deal at arm's length with
his children nor to charge them interest on loans; only congressional
action could impose such an obligation. 55
The Internal Revenue Service did not comment on the decision in
Johnson until 1973, when it issued Revenue Ruling 73-61. 5' Adopting
the Congressional test that deems property transferred "for less than
51. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D.Tex. 1966).
52. During the seven-year period the balance due on the loans averaged over
$500,000. See id. at 75-76.
53. The Commissioner defined the gift to be equivalent to sums of 3 Y % of the
average annual unpaid balance. Id. at 76.
54. Id. at 77.
55. Id. In Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950), the only case cited by
the district court in Johnson to support its decision, the Supreme Court stated that
the purpose of the gift tax was "to complement the estate tax by preventing taxfree depletion of the transferor's estate during his lifetime." Id. at 107. In its
simplistic opinion, however, the court in Johnson failed to consider adequately the
relationship between the gift and income taxes, the statutory language, and the
actual effect of the interest-free transfer on the taxpayer's estate. Several articles
criticized both the result in Johnson and its potential effects. See O'Hare, supra
note 36, at 1088; Note, The Value of the Use of Money Loaned by Taxpayers to
Their Children Without Interest Does Not Constitute a Gift, 5 Hous. L. REV. 138
(1967) ; 65 MICH. L. REV. 1014 (1967) ; 19 STAN. L. REV. 870 (1967).
56. 1973-1 C.B. 408. In this ruling the taxpayer received a $200,000 loan from
a bank. Subsequently, he lent $250,000 interest-free to his son's wholly-owned
corporation, the bulk of the proceeds to be payable on demand and the remaining
$50,000 to be due in ten years.
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an adequate and full consideration" 57 to be a gift, the Service ruled
that the recipient of a loan acquires a property interest in the use of
money, which is taxable as a gift "unless full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth is received." -5 In his ruling rejecting
the holding in Johnson, the Commissioner relied on GertrudeH. Blackburn,59 a 1953 Tax Court decision that involved a bargain sale-gift
of property from petitioner to her children. In Blackburn the petitioner paid a gift tax on the difference between the fair market value
of the property and the amount payable on the note she received for
her real estate. The Tax Court, however, upheld the Commissioner's
decision to require the petitioner to pay an additional gift tax on the
difference between the note's fair market value and its discounted
value, an amount calculated from the variance between the commercial
interest rate and the low interest rate of the note. 0
Revenue Ruling 73-61 followed logically from Blackburn: if a family transaction for inadequate interest may be taxed as a gift, then an
interest-free transfer also should be taxable. Although the ruling
relied upon a 1953 Tax Court decision, it provided the first notice that
the Commissioner would not follow the district court's holding in Johnson, which had been decided seven years earlier.
CROWN V. COMMISSIONER

The petitioner in Crown and his two brothers were equal partners
in Areljay Company (Areljay). Areljay loaned substantial amounts
of money to twenty-four trusts, the beneficiaries of which were the
partners' children and other close relatives. By the end of 1967, loans
to the trusts represented by demand notes exceeded two million dollars, with interest to be paid at six percent per annum only after demand. In addition, interest-free sums lent on open account totalled
nearly sixteen million dollars.'1 The Commissioner determined that
the use value of the loaned funds constituted a taxable gift. Regarding
six percent as a reasonable rate of interest, he computed the amount
of the gift to be in excess of one million dollars, one-third of it attribu62
table to petitioner.
The Tax Court resolved the issue, "whether interest-free loans to
relatives of the lender (or trusts for the benefit of such relatives) give
57. Id., citing I.R.C. § 2512(b).
58. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, 409.
59. 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
60. Id. at 207. The interest rate on the note was 2:V1 %; the fair market rate
imposed by the Commissioner was 4%. Id. at 205.
61. 67 T.C. at 1061.
62. The Commissioner deemed petitioner's gift to be $362,135.92. Id. at 1061-62.
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rise to taxable gifts from the lender to the borrowers to the extent of
the value of the use of the funds loaned," 63 in favor of the petitioner.
Expressly approving the district court's analysis in Johnson, the Tax
Court acknowledged that the gift tax was intended to deter the avoidance of federal estate taxes. 4 In both Crown and Johnson, however,
the estate ultimately could recover the principal of the loans. Therefore, insofar as the federal tax system requires neither the recognition
of unrealized income nor the constant reinvestment of wealth, a
refusal to charge interest on loans could not be regarded as depleting
the estate.0 5 Thus, the unrealized use value of a loan could not be
66
considered a taxable gift.
Writing for the majority in Crown, Chief Judge Dawson reviewed
several decisions in which the judiciary had declined to impose an income tax on non-interest bearing loans and concluded that the courts
uniformly had rejected all attempts by the Internal Revenue Service to
levy either income or gift taxes on those loans.57 The court also foresaw numerous administrative problems that would accompany a
decision to subject the permissive use value of intra-familial property
sharing to gift taxation. 68 Further, the Tax Court appeared to recognize that the Commissioner's failure to announce his position regarding interest-free loans before the issuance of Revenue Ruling 73-61
in 1973, seven years after the decision in Johnson, could place an unfair tax burden on those who had relied on the district court's decision. 9 Accordingly, the court concluded that any decision expanding
the scope of the gift tax to encompass the disputed transactions must
be made by Congress."0
Dissenting with three other judges, Judge Simpson concluded that
Congress intended section 2512 (b) of the Code "to reach any gratuitous transfer of any interest in property," including the conveyance of
the privilege of using money.7'1 Because the loans had not been made
in the ordinary course of business, the sole issue was "whether the
value of the property transferred exceeded the value of the consideration furnished." 72 Thus Judge Simpson determined that the peti63. Id. at 1060.
64. Id. at 1063-64.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1064.
68. Id. at 1065.
69. Id. at 1063.
70. Id. at 1065.
71. Id. at 1066 (dissenting opinion). For the relevant text of § 2512(b) see
note 16 supra.
72. 67 T.C. at 1067.
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tioners, having received no consideration for the loans, made gifts
73
equal to the use value of the money they transferred.
The dissent also objected to the court's conclusion that the Commissioner's position would create administrative problems and disrupt
many family transactions. 74 Recalling that the $3,000 annual exclusion
permitted by section 2503 (b) 75 would exempt the usual intra-familial
transfer from taxation, Judge Simpson concluded that only those
extraordinary transactions involving large sums of money, as in
Crown, would be subject to gift taxation. 70
EFFECTS OF THE DECISION IN CROWN

The Tax Court's decision in Crown creates a valuable tax avoidance
opportunity for those persons with large amounts of cash in their
estates. By making interest-free demand loans, a lender may permit
the investment of his money without acquiring income tax liability for
the resulting earnings. This consequence is desirable for a lender who
is in a higher income tax bracket than are the recipients of the earnings from the invested money. Because the earnings will be subject to
a lower income tax rate than if the lender had invested the money
himself, the recipients will receive a larger portion of the return on
the investment. Not only will the lender avoid income taxes but he also
may reduce the total amount of his estate subject to federal death
taxes because he probably would have made an income-producing in77
vestment in lieu of an interest-free loan.
Permitting the avoidance of both income and estates taxes, an
interest-free demand loan appears to be the type of transaction that
Congress intended to subject to the gift tax laws 78 and that the courts
have subjected to its provisions. 7 Moreover, other transactions
identical in substance to interest-free loans, although different in
form, are taxable as gifts. Thus, if the taxpayer invests the money, he
73. See id. at 1069.
74. Id. at 1070.

75. I.R.C. § 2503 (b).
76. 67 T.C. at 1070.
77. See O'Hare, supra note 36, at 1088.
78. See note 2 supra & accompanying text.
79. E.g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S.-303 (1945) (antenuptial property
settlement is gift if only consideration is love) ; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940) (transfer of interest coupons detached from bonds is taxable gift, with
income from coupons taxable to donor); Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308
U.S. 39 (1939) (inter vivos transfer of property in trust with reserved powers of
appointment is completed gift when power relinquished); Commissioner v. Hart,
106 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1939) (creation of estate by entireties is gift) ; Rev. Rul.
54-243, 1954-1 C.B. 318 (father's payment of adult son's expenses is gift).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:361

would be required to pay not only income taxes on the investment's
earnings but also gift taxes on the amounts transferred to his donees.
In addition, if the taxpayer establishes a short-term or a revocable
trust for the benefit of another, he may be liable for both income and
gift taxes on the amounts produced by the corpus.80 A taxpayer also
may be subject to gift taxation if he makes a low interest loan,"' forgives a debt,8 2 or permits the statute of limitations to run on the collection of a payment.8 3 Although interest-free loans logically should
receive tax treatment similar to these transactions, the Tax Court
repudiated such a possibility in Crown.
Although the Tax Court in Crown nearly overruled its earlier
opinion in Gertrude H. Blackburn,8 4 the majority's failure to refer to
Blackburn suggests that it regarded Blackburn's facts as distinct from
those of Crown and not controlling in the latter case. As a result, a
taxpayer hoping to acquire the permissible tax benefits authorized in
Crown must avoid structuring a transaction similar to that involved
in Blackburn. The pertinent facts in Crown differ from Blackburn in
two respects: first, Blackburn involved a low interest loan as opposed
to the interest-free transaction in Crown; second, the indebtedness in
Blackburn was represented by a note for a period of years whereas the
loans in Crown could be collected on demand. Although these two
differences appear to be irrelevant, 5 inasmuch as the decision in
Crown is not well-reasoned, they are meaningful and must be recognized by the taxpayer who makes interest-free loans.
Regarding the first distinction, the only difference between the two
cases is that the aggregate amount of a gift structured under Blackburn would be less because some interest is charged. The second distinction between the two cases, the type of note used in the transaction, is meaningful only insofar as it determines the time and value
of the gift. Because the loan in Blackburn was for a term of years, the
Commissioner initially could determine the discounted value of the
note and compute the entire amount of the gift. In Crown, however,
the demand note could not be discounted because its due date was uncertain. As a result, the Commissioner could not calculate at once the
80. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930). See also 19 STAN. L. Rv.
870, 875-76 (1967).
81. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra. See also Walter H. Sutliff, 46
B.T.A. 446 (1942).
82. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a) (1958).
83. Estate of Grace E. Lang v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 404 (1975).
84. For a discussion of Blackburn see text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
85. See Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060, 1068 (1977) (dissenting opinion).
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entire amount of the gift; instead, in accordance with Revenue Ruling
73-61,86 he logically determined that a gift of the use value of the
money was made in each quarter that the loans were outstanding. The
requirement that the gift from a single transaction be computed in a
number of successive quarters might have formed the basis for the
Tax Court's decision in Crown.87 Although the method of calculating
the amount of the gift usually is not determinative of whether a
gratuitous transfer actually was made, the court's refusal to permit
the taxation of interest-free demand loans may have resulted directly
from its recognition that such a practice would be administratively
88
unmanageable and would encroach upon intrafamilial transactions.
CONCLUSION

The gift tax provisions require the imposition of a tax on most
transfers of valuable interests for inadequate consideration. Although
the use value of money is capable of measurement and should be regarded as a taxable interest, the Tax Court in Crown v. Commissioner
rejected this proposition by exempting interest-free demand loans
from gift taxation. Nevertheless, because the courts of appeals have
not yet decided this issue, a taxpayer should be cautious in exploiting
the tax avoidance opportunities created by the court in Crown.
86. 1973-1 C.B. 408. For a discussion of Revenue Ruling 73-61 see notes 56-60
supra & accompanying text.
87. Actually, because the taxpayer's may compute the gife in successive
quarters, I.R.C. § 2503 (b) permits him to exclude anually from gift taxation as
much as $3,000 of the total gift to each donee. Thus, at a 5% commercial
interest rate, a $60,000 interest-free demand loan would subject its donor to no
gift tax liability. In contrast, if the loan was made for a term of years, the
total gift would be equal to the difference between the aggregate amount of the
debt and the discounted value of the note, and the donor could benefit from the
$3,000 exclusion authorized by § 2503(b) only in the loan's initial year.
88. 67 T.C. at 1065. The court's decision deviates from the longstanding judicial
practice of carefully reviewing those intrafamilial transactions that may be subject to the tax laws. See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940);
Sax Rohmer, 21 T.C. 1099, 1104 (1954); William H. Gross, 7 T.C. 837, 847 (1946).

